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**HEURISTIC POTENTIAL OF THE CONCEPT  
DYNAMICS OF THE BALANCE OF RESOURCE POTENTIAL  
NETWORK OF ACTORS OF COMMUNICATION FIELDS  
SOCIAL SYSTEMS  
IN TEACHING THE DISCIPLINES OF THE SOCIAL AND  
HUMANITARIAN CYCLE**

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*The proposed methodology is based on taking into account the dynamics of the competitive struggle for control over limited resources in society, the main strategy of which is obtaining individual benefits. Power in such a society is based on the monopoly status of the manager of resources, which is artificially supported by removing the main mass of the population from the centers of power distribution. In conditions where the goal of human activity is not collective good, but individual benefit, the implementation of state power gives subjects of power the opportunity to dispose of public resources for their own benefit (creating the phenomenon of power rent). Since the benefit from the exercise of power through the state mechanism is an order of magnitude greater than the benefit from market exchange, power itself becomes the subject of fierce competition, the plane of which is the political sphere. Hence, the most effective in analytical terms is the approach to the political sphere as a multidimensional space of competitive struggle of resource-provided groups claiming to dispose of society's resources through the mechanism of the state as a universal apparatus of administrative and power redistribution. The competition for control of the state mechanism, through which the basis of this distribution is carried out, is accompanied by a dynamic change in the balance of resource provision of actors, which leads to the evolution of social institutions through which social statuses and rights are consolidated. Power advantages represent an instrumental value for the subject of power, facilitating his access to other resources — material, social, cultural, political. Thus, a position of power allows the agent occupying it to maintain its status as a monopoly manager of significant resources. Since the phenomenon of power is formed through exchange relations, the economic system itself constantly generates a power structure within itself. Hence, the political institutions of regulation of economic exchange, the formation of which is primarily influenced by managers of the most significant resources, act as means of consolidating relations of personal dependence and non-economic coercion, merging political power and economic domination.*

**Key words:** *politics, power, power redistribution, mechanism of power reproduction, political institutionalization.*

## ЕВРИСТИЧНИЙ ПОТЕНЦІАЛ КОНЦЕПЦІЇ ДИНАМІКИ БАЛАНСУ РЕСУРСНИХ ПОТЕНЦІАЛІВ МЕРЕЖ АКТОРІВ КОМУНІКАЦІЙНИХ ПОЛІВ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ СИСТЕМ У ВИКЛАДАННІ ДИСЦИПЛІН СОЦІАЛЬНО-ГУМАНІТАРНОГО ЦИКЛУ

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*Протягом останнього тридцятиліття в основі викладання соціально-гуманітарних дисциплін лежала лінійна концепція демократичного транзиту, яка не змогла пройти емпіричного підтвердження. Сьогодні в навчальний процес доцільно запроваджувати методології, засновані на нелінійних конфліктологічних підходах, які підтверджуються реальною динамікою соціально-політичних відносин. Пропонована методологія заснована на урахуванні динаміки конкурентної боротьби за контроль над обмеженими ресурсами в суспільстві, основною стратегією якого є отримання індивідуальної вигоди. Влада в такому суспільстві базується на монопольному статусі розпорядника ресурсів, який штучно підтримується шляхом відсторонення основної маси населення від центрів владного розподілу. Конкуренція за опанування механізмом держави, через який здійснюється основа цього розподілу, супроводжується динамічною зміною балансу ресурсного забезпечення акторів, що приводить до еволюції соціальних інститутів, через які відбувається закріплення соціальних статусів та прав.*

***Ключові слова:** політика, влада, владний перерозподіл, механізм відтворення влади, політична інституціоналізація.*

**Formulation of the problem.** The systemic crisis of the existing world political order, which takes on clearer outlines every year, puts on the agenda the problem not only of improving scientific methods of researching political relations, but also of mercilessly eliminating from scientific circulation those concepts that, claiming the status of theories, do not have real scientific base. The most expressive of them was the concept of democratic transit, the cornerstone of which is the linear transition of societies from totalitarianism and autocracy to "Western-type" democracy. Today, after three decades of using the concept of democratic transit in the educational process, its theoretical fragility is even more obvious than before. The social system of post-industrial society around the world is undergoing fundamental changes, moving from the principles of market distribution with relatively open social elevators to the principles of power-administrative distribution, using institutional restrictions on access to resources and power.

**Analysis of current research.** Understanding the trends of global political transformations in Western political science has made the transition from the

Hegelian linear equilibrium concept of social development to non-linear, conflictual concepts presented in the works of Theodor Adorno, Immanuel Wallerstein, Jürgen Habermas, Karl Deutsch, Douglas North, Eric Olin Wright, Teotoniu Dus Santush. Domestic researchers mostly describe the political system as striving for balance in the process of linear development from totalitarianism to democracy. A number of authors of textbooks on socio-humanitarian disciplines generally blur the line between the concepts of power and politics, describing the latter as the process of managing public affairs and the sphere of regulating the rights and freedoms of members of society. However, the approaches of the sociologist Lyubov Bevzenko (the basis of her author's concept is the method of synergy and the principle of unbalanced dynamics), based on the non-linearity and multidimensional imbalance of social relations in the context of social antagonisms, political scientists Kost Bondarenko (who in operative analysis uses a systemic approach in combination with game theory), Andriy Ermolayev (conflictological approach and systemic analysis), Oleksandr Fisun (concept of neopatrimonialism, conflictological approach, systemic analysis) and other researchers.

The purpose of this article is a brief description of the author's concept of the dynamics of the balance of resource potentials of networks of actors in the communication fields of social systems, which is used in the analysis of socio-political relations, taking into account the factor of competition for access to limited resources in a society focused on obtaining individual benefits. This concept, which is one of the numerous attempts of researchers to develop a methodology for teaching the disciplines of the socio-humanitarian cycle adequate to the current level of scientific knowledge, is based on the provisions of system analysis, neo-institutionalism, game theory, taking into account the principle of unbalanced dynamics. By the author, it was tested in the field of applied political science and laid in the methodological basis of a number of textbooks and teaching aids on the disciplines of the social and humanitarian cycle, which were taught in higher and secondary schools.

**Presenting main material.** In the process of society's existence, certain forms and principles of organization develop in it, with the help of which society maintains its unity and viability. These principles are based on the method of distribution of material resources and spiritual values between different social groups, which is carried out with the help of state power relations. Flows of resources (not only material, but also informational, spiritual, organizational, power, etc.), directed to the development and reproduction of social infrastructure (which constitutes the artificial environment for the existence of society), as well as the process of their creation or extraction, are regulated by the mediation of power relations.

In conditions where the goal of human activity is not collective good, but individual benefit, the implementation of state power gives subjects of power the opportunity to dispose of public resources for their own benefit (creating the phenomenon of power rent). Since the benefit from the exercise of power through the state mechanism is an order of magnitude greater than the benefit from market exchange, power itself becomes the subject of fierce competition, the plane of which is the political sphere. Hence, the most effective in analytical terms is the approach to the political sphere as a multidimensional space of competitive struggle of resource-provided groups claiming to dispose of society's resources through the mechanism of the state as a universal apparatus of administrative and power redistribution.

This space constitutes a dynamically changing force field of power, which is created under the influence of the balance of forces of certain networks of resource-provided groups, as well as the resistance of social groups and classes expropriated by them. In this field, political subjectivity (and the status of power centers) is achieved only through the acquisition of a sufficient volume of resource provision and organization. By organization, it is necessary to understand not only the presence of a certain complex of social institutions, but also the ability of a certain part of society to purposeful long-term collective interaction through these institutions, aimed at the realization of its group interests. In turn, since these

interests are related to the management of resources, political institutions are formed based on the need to control certain flows of resources and adapt to changes in these flows. Institutions that proved incapable of timely adaptation die or move to the periphery of social relations (clear examples are the demise of suzerainty in the sphere of state power in a developed feudal society, absolute monarchy in a modern society, and mass parties in a postmodern society).

The very mechanism of power reproduction is based on the fact that the subject of power has a monopoly on the distribution of certain resources that are relevant for the object as their potential consumer. If the consumer does not have alternative sources of obtaining vital resources, he becomes dependent on their manager and, in the end, is ready to recognize the latter's right to rule over himself (North, 1990). The entry of an exclusive resource into general use sharply undermines its significance, and therefore the power position of the manager of this resource. Therefore, maintaining a monopoly on the distribution of the resource necessary for the consumer is a necessary condition for maintaining a position of power, and maintaining structural dependence on a limited resource is the main task of its manager.

Structural dependence is formed as a result of artificially restricting the access of agents of exchange to significant resources and opportunities to dispose of them. The social, economic and political institutions formed in this society and the corresponding institutional interactions determine the rules by which a member of society can use his individual resources to achieve goals that are important to him (Dahl, 1971). As a result of the action of these institutions, even an agent who potentially owns resources often turns out to be dependent due to artificially created barriers that reduce the number of alternative interactions in which he can engage in order to realize his interests in obtaining important goods for him.

Thus, uneven access to resources for different social groups in the process of primary distribution determines the internal instability of society. At the same time, the concentration of resources is directly proportional to the concentration of power. Preferential access to resources for a certain social group means its higher

ability to alienate them from a less resource-provided part of society, and accordingly – a greater degree of exercising control over them. The set of relations of dominance and subordination forms the social hierarchy of society. It follows that the social hierarchy is determined by the degree of access to resources for different social groups (Denysenko, 2019).

At the same time, the apparatus of the state, within the framework of which authoritative decisions binding on the entire society are made and their implementation is ensured, is itself a technological resource of power over society (Denysenko, 2019). At a certain level, the resources concentrated in the hands of the state become a separate object of potential development by those social groups that are able to exert a decisive influence on redistribution decisions.

In the process of influencing the mechanism of power decision-making in the person of the state, various social groups acquire the character of subjects and objects of political activity. The instruments of such influence are political parties, organizations and movements, as well as «interest groups», representing the interests of certain social groups (or narrower groups within them) in the competition for non-economic preferential access to resources. Given that a high degree of concentration of resources in the hands of the most resource-rich social groups means a higher ability of the latter to non-economic (through the use of state power) alienation of resources from the rest of society, the political dominance of a resource-rich minority over the majority is a systemic factor. The majority is able to compensate for this factor by uniting in mass political parties (creating a united mega-resource). However, at the same time, the problem of alienation by functionaries who make up the party apparatus, described in the «iron law of oligarchization of political organizations» by R. Michels, of the powers and management resources granted to them on behalf of the organization (Michels, 1915) arises.

The nation, which consists of competing among themselves in the struggle for access to the resources of social groups and groups, is not an internally unified subject of politics. The state of competitive political struggle within a nation is a

systemic factor. At the same time, the minority of the nation, thanks to the high concentration of resources, is able to subjugate the majority to its rule, thanks to which it gets the right to act in its interests on behalf of this majority. Thus, in reality, the nation is represented by a political elite – a resource-provided minority that dominates society.

The political elite turns into a factor of destabilization of society when the threshold of the share of resources alienated for its own benefit is exceeded, which is critical for the reproduction of society. Given that the alienation of resources by the elite for their own benefit has a systemic nature, this phenomenon is also systemic. Thus, political elites play a key role in the formation of crises accompanying the development of the state and society.

At the same time, the exclusive right of state power institutions to dispose of public resources that are subject to regulation by the state creates the so-called power or political rent. A detailed description of the essence of this rent was presented within the framework of the macroeconomic theory of groups, which interprets the search for rent as the result of the interaction of certain interest groups. In economic theory, rent is considered as the profit of the owner of the resource, which exceeds the opportunity cost of its use. A strategy aimed at obtaining income from the use of rent is called rent-oriented behavior.

Such behavior on the part of the personnel of the state power apparatus is due, on the one hand, to the possibility and ability of the corporation of officials to make independent decisions regarding the redistribution of resources, and on the other hand, the necessity for certain resource-provided groups, whose opportunities to obtain maximum profit are limited by the provisions of the collective agreement, to violate institutional norms by exchanging part of their resources for preferential access to a larger amount of resources due to the adoption of a powerful decision in their favor.

The position of the political elite as a manager of resources taken from society for the benefit of the state (for public needs) allows it to alienate part of these resources for its own benefit. At the same time, the profitability of the

disposal of state resources (including technological ones, such as the state apparatus, the legislative system, etc.) significantly exceeds the profitability of economic activity. An increase in the resources alienated in society in the long term entails an increase in the number of the political elite and an increase in its requests, as well as an increase in the number and increase in the requests of social groups that serve the interests of the political elite and therefore receive certain resources, management and supervisory powers from it.

As we see power advantages represent an instrumental value for the subject of power, facilitating his access to other resources – material, social, cultural, political. Thus, a position of power allows the agent occupying it to maintain its status as a monopoly manager of significant resources. Since the phenomenon of power is formed through exchange relations, the economic system itself constantly generates a power structure within itself. Hence, the political institutions of regulation of economic exchange, the formation of which is primarily influenced by managers of the most significant resources, act as means of consolidating relations of personal dependence and non-economic coercion, merging political power and economic domination. Equal access to resources and power open to all citizens, which is proclaimed as the main achievement of a Western-style democratic society, does not exist by default. Instead, there is an order of «restricted access» that is constantly reproduced through a hierarchical system of privileges and power rents (rents from participation in the power redistribution of public resources) belonging to different groups of elites. The consolidated position of various segments of elite groups regarding the preservation of their power status is one of the important conditions for the preservation of institutional barriers that ensure the systematic elimination of the majority of citizens from real influence on the adoption of socially significant power decisions. In turn, the majority of citizens who do not have enough resources to independently participate in political competition can realize their interest in participating in the control over the power distribution of resources only by joining mass political organizations (including not only parties and public organizations political direction, but also local self-

government). However, this possibility is systematically restrained by elite groups due to the replacement in the mass consciousness of real political interests by virtual ones, which cannot lead to the unification of the population into a nation (as an association of politically full-fledged citizens who are formally the collective bearer of state power) and do not threaten the elite's privileged power status.

The political system is constantly in a state of conflict (open or hidden) between the participants of the political process. At the same time, the mutual competition of political subjects absorbs resources that do not enter the production sphere, restraining the pace of development of social infrastructure and limiting the general benefit of all participants in the political confrontation. Trying to minimize its costs in the conditions of a known result in advance, resource-provided groups make certain agreements among themselves regarding the procedure for access to control over the administrative redistribution of resources, which are embodied primarily in political institutions (including the state and its regulatory and legal field). The law, like the government, is subjective and in a strategic sense performs the function of distinguishing the rights of the subjects of the agreement depending on the arrangement of their forces. A change in the balance of potentials entails a departure from old agreements and a transition to a new level of conflict, which can end either in the creation of a new system of agreements based on a changed balance of forces, or in the complete liquidation of old political institutions and the formation of new ones in their place. Thus, it is the agreements between the networks of resource-provided subjects of political competition that are the basis for the evolution of political institutions, which, in turn, change under the influence of changes in the balance of forces of the participants in the political confrontation.

Figuratively and somewhat conditionally in the teaching process, the political system can be characterized as a kind of «power exchange», which includes:

– the positions of the subjects of the competitive struggle for access to the centers of power (which are simultaneously the centers of the power redistribution

of resources), as well as the «brokerage places» of the officials who dispose of the power powers in these centers;

- «power market» (positions of those who must be subordinated to the power);

- a system of relationships between all (active and passive) participants in the political process;

- organizational structures that secure this system of relationships.

In the conditions of limited access to the centers of power decision-making, the legitimation of the power of the elite was provided by the illusion of quasi-elitist consumption for the so-called middle class as the social support of the society, which was positioned as liberal-democratic.

However, it is necessary to take into account at least three factors. First, the level of consumption for the middle class was not fixed by its access to control over the sources of this consumption, which in the conditions of the cartel-controlled oligopoly financial system prevented the accumulation in the hands of the bulk of citizens of the resource base due to the systematic depreciation of accumulations. Secondly, a significant share of such accumulations was redirected not to real consumption, but to speculation in securities, which are controlled by the same cartels of financial oligopolies. As a result, a speculative financial pyramid was created, which ensures the control of the population's resources by the ruling elite. Thirdly, in the post-industrial period, the possibility of endless expansion of the market due to the absorption of territories and populations not included in the process of capitalist exchange has actually been exhausted. The resulting drop in the rate of profit in developed economies led to a sharp reduction in the resource base of the middle class and a corresponding decrease in its political weight.

It is easy to assume that already in the short term, this will lead to a noticeable decrease in consumption for the same middle class (not to mention the masses of social assistance recipients), which can cause a cumulative effect of reducing market capacity and, as a result, budget revenues. From this, it becomes

inevitable that the competition for access to the right to dispose of limited resources for representatives of the ruling elite and the traditional provocation of certain segments of it by protest social movements in order to weaken the positions of competitors are inevitable. The result of the aggravation of such a struggle, in turn, will be a rather noticeable adaptation of social institutions, in particular the institutions of power, to a stricter demarcation of the social statuses of social groups. It is doubtful that in conditions of concentration of material and power resources in the hands of elite groups, this adaptation will be a reflection of the expansion of the rights and freedoms of the majority of citizens. Accordingly, the principle of linearity of social development from unfreedom to democracy, embedded in traditional textbooks, loses its relevance to real life.

**Conclusions and prospects for further research.** Social antagonisms are based on the problem of access to resource provision, control over which is carried out through the mechanisms of public power, first of all, state power. Politics as a field of competitive struggle for access to power centers and power redistribution of resources is a field of permanent conflicts, which have a sufficient amount of resource potential (including organizational and informational) to participate in competition. The resolution of these conflicts leads to the institutional consolidation of a certain order of access to power and resources, which is embodied in the state organization (including the legal system) and the sphere of social communication. A radical change in the balance of potentials provokes a new level of conflict, which leads to a new delimitation of the rights of subjects with corresponding changes in the sphere of the political system. This process, which is the basis of political institutionalization, is the most promising for the creation of a methodology for teaching the disciplines of the social and humanitarian cycle, which will allow the formation of a new generation of specialists capable of making responsible managerial and civic decisions aimed at the effective development of the nation and the national state.

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